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Comment
Young, Talented, and Fired: The New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination and the Right Decision in
Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler
Chad A. Stewart*
In Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler,' twenty-five year-old
Michael Sisler was replaced by an older employee at Bergen
Commercial Bank following a five-month employment period.2
Thereafter, Sisler brought an age discrimination suit under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).3 Breaking
with prior decisions under the statute, 4 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that the LAD permitted a person under forty
to bring an age discrimination claim 5
Sisler questioned whether the protection cast by the LAD
was broad enough to allow an individual under forty to bring
an age discrimination claim.6 This inquiry is significant-if in-
dividuals under the age of forty can assert age discrimination
claims under the New Jersey anti-age discrimination statute,
they will be granted protection they have been unable to attain
under other statutory7 and constitutional provisions. 8 In short,
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA. The author extends special thanks to Cynthia
Arends, Matt Bensen, Jill Radloff, Eric Riensche and Professor Jim Chen for
their efforts and advice with this Comment. Thanks also to my parents for
their support and to Professor Brad Bateman who has been both a mentor and
a good friend.
1. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
2. See id. at 948.
3. See id.
4. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 953 (stating that the legislature must have
concluded that younger individuals should also be entitled to bring claims un-
der the LAD).
6. See id. at 955-57.
7. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
8. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991) (stating that "[tihis
court has said repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification under the
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if states can legislate to allow younger individuals to bring age
discrimination claims, the age restrictions imposed by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 9 will no longer limit protec-
tion from age discrimination to those over the age of forty.
This Comment seeks to establish that the Supreme Court
of New Jersey interpreted the LAD correctly in permitting a
twenty-five year-old to state a valid age discrimination claim,
but that the court erred by not providing a more rigorous
analysis. Part I provides context for the Sisler decision through
an examination of relevant statutes, legislative history, and
case law preceding the decision. Part II explains the Sisler
holding and reasoning in detail. Part III criticizes the Sisler
court for failing to support the plain meaning of the LAD when
the opportunity was available. Part III further asserts that the
Sisler court erred by insufficiently exploring possible inferences
of legislative intent and by neglecting to analyze the preemp-
tion question. Finally, this Comment concludes that despite its
weaknesses, the Sisler decision signals an opportunity for
states to provide employment protection for individuals under
the age of forty.
I. THE LAW PRIOR TO BERGEN COMMERCIAL BANK V.
SISLER
Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) in 1967 to address arbitrary age discrimination
suffered by older workers in the labor force.'0 A survey of the
Equal Protection Clause.").
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
10. See id. § 621. Congress's statement of findings and purpose for the
ADEA is as follows:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older work-
ers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain em-
ployment, and especially to regain employment when displaced
from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential
for job performance has become common practice, and certain
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term un-
employment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high
among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and
their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce
1690 [Vol. 84:1689
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legislative history of the statute expands upon this broad
statement of purpose and states that the aim of the legislation
is to promote the employment of older workers based on their
ability.1
A. THE AGE RANGE
Perhaps the most controversial element of this remedial
legislation centered on the establishment of who the legislation
was designed to protect. Based primarily on a report by the
Secretary of Labor,12 Congress defined the protected class to in-
clude individuals between the ages of forty and sixty-five.' 3
The Secretary's extensive findings confirmed the need to pro-
tect older workers.' 4 According to the report, many establish-
ments had declined to hire any workers who had reached the
age of forty-five. 15 The report further indicated that age was
not a factor in calculating ability,16 that it had little to do with
job performance, 7 that older workers were often a benefit in
and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to pro-
hibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.
Id.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 1-2 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214 (indicating that "the purpose of [the ADEA is] to
promote the employment of older workers based on their ability" and that
"[the prohibitions in the [ADEAI apply to employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations").
12. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERIcAN WORKER:
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER].
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(c)(1) (providing that individuals must be forty
or older to bring a federal age discrimination claim).
14. See generally OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 12.
15. See id. at 5 (explaining that 20% of the surveyed establishments indi-
cated that during the previous year they had failed to hire any workers age 45
or over). But see id. at 14 ("A considerable number of employers reported an
amenability to hiring older workers but claimed that few applied. Making ap-
plications may not be a popular method of seeking work, and discouraged
older workers may not be sufficiently aggressive to use it.").
16. See id. at 81 (indicating that a survey of many studies reveals that age
alone is a poor indicator of ability).
17. See id. at 86 (noting that in work requiring substantial physical exer-
tion, productivity decreased markedly in advanced age groups, but that pro-
ductivity remained nearly constant across age groups in less physically de-
manding activities). See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL. NO. 1223, COMPARATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE BY AGE (1957);
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the workplace rather than a liability, 8 and that contrary to
conventional beliefs, older workers had quite healthy attitudes
about their jobs. 19 In addition to these factors, the Secretary
emphasized the difficulties that older workers faced when at-
tempting to find new employment following termination.20 One
of the most problematic aspects of older workers' unemploy-
ment was that they typically remained unemployed for longer
periods of time than workers in other age groups. 21
B. STATES MAY PASS ANTI-AGE DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
Another important provision of the ADEA concerns the
relationship between federal and state legislation in age dis-
crimination. Specifically, Congress authorized the states to
Ronald E. Kutscher & James F. Walker, Comparative Job Performance of Of-
fice Workers by Age, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 39, 39-43 (1960); James F.
Walker, The Job Performance of Federal Mail Sorters by Age, 87 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 296, 296-300 (1964).
18. See OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 12, at 15. The report
stated as follows:
Most of the employers named stability, dependability, and knowl-
edge and experience as the main attributes of older workers that in-
fluenced their willingness to employ them. Other reasons cited were:
less absenteeism; good work habits and attitudes; ability or skills;
quality or quantity of work; pride in work; and consistent perform-
ance and adaptability.
Id.
19. See id. at 88 (indicating that studies do not support the contention
that older workers have poor attitudes).
20. See id. at 89. Many factors outside the control of older workers lead to
substantial difficulties in finding reemployment. See id. Among these difficul-
ties are low levels of education, low skill levels, and inability to adjust to occu-
pational, pay, or geographic changes. See id. But see SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
OF REPRESENTATIVES THOMPSON OF NEW JERSEY, HOLLAND, DENT, O'HARA
OF MICHIGAN, HAWKINS, GIBBONS, WILLIAM D. FORD OF MICHIGAN,
HATHAWAY, MINK, SCHEUER, AND MEEDS ON H.R. 13054 (addressing the fact
that arbitrary age discrimination is occurring continually in the airline indus-
try, which stipulates that flight attendants must retire at 32). Also significant
is the reasoning in the legislative history for not extending the age discrimina-
tion protection to these stewardesses---[i]t deserves mention again, that the
only reason the committee bill does not specifically address this discrimina-
tion" is because the major purpose of the bill is to protect older workers. Id. at
6.
21. See OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 12, at 98. In 1964, when a
monthly average of more than 1 million persons 45 and over were unemployed,
their unemployment lasted an average of 19.4 weeks, compared with 11.0
weeks for those under 45. See id. But see id. at 99 (providing chart indicating
that unemployment rates for individuals between the ages of 20 and 24 were
more than twice as high as that for workers 65 and over).
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draft legislation to protect workers from age discrimination,22
with the proviso that suits under the federal legislation would
supersede any state suit.23 New Jersey's age amendment to the
Law Against Discrimination (LAD)24 was one of twenty states
that remained valid under this federal provision. 25 At the time
the LAD was passed, New Jersey was one of only four states
that seemingly allowed younger individuals to bring claims
based on age discrimination. 26
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1994) (expressing congressional desire for
states to legislate in this area by requiring plaintiffs to explore state remedies
before pursuing action under the ADEA).
23. See id. § 633(b). Two circuit courts have considered the contours of
§ 633(a) and concluded that the language does not permit federal courts to
stay state court proceedings. See Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 168 F.3d 734,
740 (5th Cir. 1999) ("We conclude that § 633(a) does not constitute express
Congressional authorization for federal courts to enter injunctions staying
state judicial proceedings involving parallel state law age discrimination
claims."); Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 256 (2d
Cir. 1991) (concluding that a federal court is authorized to stay only state ad-
ministrative proceedings involving claims of age discrimination, not state
court suits under such statutes).
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). Section
10:5-4 provides: "All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employ-
ment... without discrimination because of... age .... This opportunity is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right." Section 10:5-12(a) provides that
it shall be an unlawful employment practice or discrimination "[flor an em-
ployer, because of... age ... to discharge or require to retire, unless justified
by lawful considerations other than age." However, section 10:5-12(a) contains
a proviso stating that the section does not "bar an employer from refusing to
accept for employment or to promote any person over 70 years of age." Fi-
nally, section 10:5-2.1 provides in relevant part: "Nothing contained in this
act.., shall be construed to require... the employment of any person under
the age of 18, nor to prohibit the establishment and maintenance of bona fide
occupational qualifications .... "
25. See OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 12, at 107. In May 1965,
20 states and Puerto Rico had enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination in
employment based on age. See id. The states and territories having such leg-
islation in 1965 included the following: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto
Rico, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
26. See OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 12, at 116 (setting forth
the following states and corresponding age ranges: Colorado (between 18 and
60), Louisiana (under 50), New Jersey (21 and over), and Oregon (between 25
and 65)). At present, a number of states maintain anti-age discrimination
laws that either contain no minimum age restrictions or that set the minimum
age at 18. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (1999) (any age); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 216.6(1) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (any age); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1112(a),
1113 (1993) (minimum age is 18); MICH. CoMP. LAWs §§ 37.2102, 37.2103(a)
(1985 & Supp. 1999) (any age); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (1995 & Supp.
1999) (any age). At the same time, however, other States continue to require
20001 1693
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Until Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler,27 the New Jersey
courts had never allowed an individual under the age of forty to
state a claim based on age discrimination, 28 despite the fact
that the LAD does not contain a lower limit defining the pro-
tected class.29 In fact, such LAD suits were governed for the
most part by the same procedures and substantive burdens im-
posed in suits brought under the ADEA.30
that the age discrimination plaintiff be at least 40 years of age. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 25-1-21 (Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-3-202 (Michie 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-2(a) (1998); IDAHO CODE § 67-5910(7) (1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 344.020(1)(b) (Michie 1997); MAss. GEN. LAwS. ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 1(8) (West 1999).
27. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
28. The New Jersey Supreme Court had side-stepped the issue in Sprague
v. Glassboro State College, a case where a nontenured 26 year-old professor at
a state college filed a verified complaint with the Division on Civil Rights al-
leging that the college and its president had denied him tenure because of his
age. 391 A.2d 558, 559 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (per curiam). The
field representative determined that tenure decisions were not made on the
basis of age. See id. at 560. Summarizing her findings, the field representa-
tive noted that "[t]he investigation revealed that the respondents grant tenure
in the Administrative Studies Department either to individuals who have a
doctorate or a comparable amount of experience in business." Id. Since the
professor had neither a doctorate nor extensive business experience, the court
was satisfied that the college denied him tenure not because of age discrimina-
tion, but simply "because he failed to meet the uniform standards of the col-
lege." Id. at 561.
29. Nowhere in the statute did the New Jersey Legislature define the
term "age." However, the word is defined in many commonly used dictionar-
ies. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 40 (1986)
(providing a number of definitions of the word "age").
30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and LAD are governed
by the same standards and allocation of burdens of proof."); Maidenbaum v.
Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994) ("Age discrimi-
nation claims under the LAD are governed by the same standards and burden
of proof structures applicable under the ADEA."), affd mem., 67 F.3d 291 (3d
Cir. 1995); see also Jon W. Green & Kyle M. Francis, Age Discrimination in
Employment: A Plaintiffs Perspective, in LITIGATION 1995, at 227, 229 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5212, 1995) (noting
that the standard of proof of age discrimination is generally the same under
federal and state law). One major difference between federal and state en-
forcement, however, is that "[als a rule, the state courts have interpreted civil
rights [statutes] less stringently than conservative federal courts." Id. Ac-
cordingly, the article concludes, it is more favorable to bring age discrimina-
tion claims in state courts. See id.; cf Bitsko v. Main Pharmacy, Inc., 673 A.2d
825, 827 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (noting that in "an age-
discrimination case involving unequal pay for equal work asserted under the
LAD is governed by the 'broader approach' of Title VII").
1694 [Vol. 84:1689
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C. AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS UNDER WASHINGTON, OREGON,
AND ALASKA STATUTES: CONFLICTING CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
THE PROTECTED CLASS?
In Gross v. City of Lynnwood,31 the Supreme Court of
Washington decided a case involving a thirty-five year-old male
who had been rejected for a position as a fire fighter on three
separate occasions, despite strong performances on both writ-
ten and oral examinations. 32 The apparent reason for this re-
jection was that the applicant was ineligible for enrollment in
the Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement
System (LEOFFRS).33 The provision that excluded him from
enrolling in the plan required that applicants be under the age
of thirty-five. 34 Based on this rejection, the appellant filed suit
alleging a violation of Washington's law against age discrimi-
nation.35
Washington had two applicable statutory provisions pro-
hibiting age discrimination in employment. The first provision
stated that an employer may not refuse to hire any person be-
cause of the person's age. 36 The second provision prohibited
employers from discriminating against workers between the
ages of forty and sixty-five in all employment decisions.37
Acknowledging that the first provision prohibited age dis-
crimination against younger workers,38 the court addressed
whether the second one served as a limitation upon the total
prohibition of age discrimination. 39 Undertaking this inquiry,
the court noted that its primary objective was to give effect to
the legislative intent behind the statute, and that such intent
should be determined by analyzing the statutory context as a
whole.40 Using this axiom as its guide, the court turned to the
well-known rule of statutory construction that a statute should
31. 583 P.2d 1197 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).




36. See id. at 1199 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180).
37. See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.090).
38. See id. (noting that section 49.60.180 represents a "total prohibition
against age discrimination").
39. See id. (stating that "[appellant has a cause of action against respon-





be interpreted to avoid rendering other provisions superflu-
ous.41
The court determined that giving full effect to the total
prohibition against age discrimination contained in the first
provision would render the language of the second provision-
prohibiting discrimination against those between the ages of
forty and sixty-five-mere surplusage.42  Such a result, the
court reasoned, could not have been intended by the legisla-
ture.4
3
As additional support for this determination, the court
noted that the basic purpose of an age-discrimination statute is
to protect older workers from forced retirement and other dis-
crimination, not to protect younger workers." Moreover,
reading the two applicable statutory provisions in accordance
with one another, the court held that Washington's age dis-
crimination statute only provided protection for persons ages
forty to sixty-five. 45
In Ogden v. Bureau of Labor,46 the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon considered whether a thirty year-old woman could bring an
age discrimination claim under the state's age discrimination
statute.47 The statute provided that it was unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate in employment on the basis of age if the
individual was between the ages of eighteen and seventy.48 In
Ogden, the employer refused to hire a thirty year-old woman
for a position at the employer's retirement home, in part be-
cause the employer felt that the applicant was too young.49 The
employer maintained that because age was not the "sole factor"
in her decision, the plaintiff could not bring a valid age dis-




44. See id. (citing as an example the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970)).
45. See id. at 1200.
46. 699 P.2d 189 (Or. 1985).
47. See id. at 190.
48. See id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(a)).
49. See id.
50. Id. In contending that age must be the sole factor, the employer relied
on section 659.015 of the state code, declaring that it is the public policy of the
state of Oregon that "[tihe abilities of an individual, and not any arbitrary
standards which discriminate against an individual solely because of his age,
should be the measure of the individual's fitness and qualification for em-
1696 [Vol. 84:1689
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able51 and concluded that the plaintiffs claim was legitimate
because she fell within the statute's explicit age range.52
In Simpson v. Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights,53 a federal district court permitted a sixty-five year-old
plaintiff to bring an age discrimination claim that otherwise
would have been precluded under the ADEA.54 Upon reaching
the age of sixty-five, an employer allegedly terminated Simpson
because of his age.55 Simpson brought suit under Alaska's age
discrimination statute.56 The statute, enacted two years prior
to the ADEA,57 specifically prohibited age discrimination "in
compensation or in a term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment ... when the reasonable demands of the position do not
require distinction on the basis of age."58 Based on the plain
language of the statute,59 the legislative intent behind the stat-
ute,60 and its rejection of federal preemption,61 the Simpson
ployment." Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
51. See id. (observing that attributing the literal meaning of the term
"solely" to the age discrimination statute would limit the scope of the statute's
protection to cases where "the employer's explicit or actual policy were to give
preference to an older or a younger employee without regard to any other
characteristic, qualification, or performance" and concluding that the statute
should not be bound by such a "limited view of the law").
52. See id. at 192.
53. 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), affd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.
1979).
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1994) (stating that "[niothing in this chapter
shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has
attained 65 years of age").
55. See Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 553.
56. See id. at 554.
57. The fact that the Alaska statute preceded the ADEA is significant.
Although the Simpson court did not mention it, there is a presumption against
implied repeals. See infra text accompanying note 71. Under this theory,
Congress is presumed to be aware of the Alaska law, and no changes to it are
presumed in the absence of explicit statement. See infra note 71 and accom-
panying text.
58. See Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 554 (quoting ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.220(a)(1)).
59. See id. (contending that "[t]he statute unequivocally states that there
shall be no discrimination based on age").
60. See id. (noting that the legislature must have realized that the term
"age" was open-ended because the statute's declaration of purpose explicitly
stated that the statute was not intended to supercede other state statutes con-
cerning child labor, the age of majority or other age requirements).
61. The Simpson court's discussion of preemption is particularly enlight-
ening. See id. at 555 ("Preemption occurs when compliance with both federal
and state regulations is physically impossible, the nature of the subject matter
requires federal supremacy and uniformity, or Congress intended to displace
2000] 1697
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court held that the sixty-five year-old plaintiff was able to state
a valid age discrimination claim.62
D. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A familiar rule of statutory construction holds that any
analysis must begin with the text of the statute itself.63 If the
text is clear and unambiguous, further inquiry is unnecessary
and the statute should be implemented as written.64 In an ef-
fort to find the plain meaning of a statutory term, courts fre-
quently consult popular dictionaries.65
state legislation.") (citations omitted). The Simpson court reached two conclu-
sions. First, the federal and state statutes worked in a complementary man-
ner and it was possible to comply with both. See id. Stating that "conflicts in
legislation should not be sought out where none exist[,]" the court found the
case for preemption to be rather weak. Id. at 556. Second, the Alaska law
preceded the ADEA and nothing in the ADEA suggested an intent to limit the
reach of the Alaska statute. See id. Further, preemption in the realm of em-
ployment is particularly unlikely, given the states' broad authority to regulate
in this area under their police powers. See id; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253 (1994) (noting that "(pireemption of employment
standards 'within the traditional police power of the State' 'should not be
lightly inferred'"). For additional discussion of preemption in relation to the
ADEA, see generally Michael D. Moberly, A Better ADEA?: Using State Wage
Payment Laws To Enhance Remedies for Age Discrimination, 32 TULSA L.J. 21
(1996) (stating that the ADEA established minimum standards and that
states were left free to expand upon them).
62. See Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 556. It is also worthy of note that since
the Simpson and Ogden decisions, Congress has done nothing to indicate that
it does not agree with the conclusions of those courts. See United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (noting that under
the acquiescence rule, such congressional inaction "is at least some evidence of
the reasonableness of that construction").
63. See, e.g., Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Director, Div. on Civil Rights,
682 A.2d 750, 751-52 (N.J. Super. Court. App. Div. 1996) (stating that it is the
court's duty "to apply the legislative intent as expressed in the statute's lan-
guage, and.., not to presume that the Legislature intended something other
than what it expressed by its plain language").
64. See, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1991) (noting that a
strong presumption exists that a statute is to be applied as written except in
infrequent circumstances where a contrary legislative intent is clearly ex-
pressed); Gangemi v. Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1957) ("In the case of all writ-
ten laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced; and, in the ab-
sence of ambiguity calling for permissible extrinsic aids, this intent is to be
found in the instrument itself.").
65. Both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme
Court have consulted popular dictionaries for guidance in the absence of statu-
tory definition. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) (consulting Webster's Third International Dictionary
to find the meaning of the term "to modify"); In re Adoption of Children by
G.P.B., Jr., 736 A.2d 1277, 1283 (N.J. 1999) (using Webster's Third Interna-
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If the text of the statute is found to be unclear, the courts
attempt to discern the legislative intent in passing the stat-
ute.66 This task necessitates an inquiry into the statute's leg-
islative history, including floor debates, committee reports, and
committee debates.67 Where such history is unavailable or un-
reliable, many extrinsic aids to statutory construction are used
to help determine legislative intent. Among these aids are the
following canons of statutory construction: expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,6 8 the theory of the dog that did not bark,69 the
tional Dictionary to define a word not defined in the statute); Brooks v. Odom,
696 A.2d 619, 622 (N.J. 1997) (turning to Black's Law Dictionary, Taber's Cy-
clopedic Medical Dictionary, and Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary for defi-
nitions of the words "permanent," "loss," "bodily," and "function," since no
definitions were provided in the statute itself); State v. Mortimer, 641 A.2d
257, 260 (N.J. 1994) (employing a dictionary to define a word of Pakistani de-
scent). But cf Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135 (1991) (stating that "under" has
many dictionary definitions and therefore its meaning must be drawn from the
statutory context).
66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpreta-
tion As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN L. REV. 321, 340-43 (1990) (discussing
the limits of relying on textualism alone).
67. See WILIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 733 n.1 (2d ed. 1995).
68. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means "the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed.
1990). For examples of case law applying the expressio unius canon, see TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (holding that in the context Endangered Spe-
cies Act, the expressio unius canon must be invoked to exclude any additional
exemptions not explicitly stated in the Act); Keeley v. Loomis Fargo & Co., 183
F.3d 257, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (using expressio unius to conclude that the
New Jersey Legislature's explicit exclusion of some things from overtime
wages requirement precluded any other exceptions), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
983 (2000). But see State v. Dicarlo, 338 A.2d 809, 814 (N.J. 1975) (explaining
that expressio unius is subordinate to the higher principle of giving effect to,
rather than defeating, legislative intent).
69. Under this theory, nothing of importance in the statute is deemed to
have changed if there is no discussion in the legislative history to support it.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-96 (1991) (refusing to interpret the
term "representatives" in a fashion so as to exclude judicial elections from cov-
erage under a statute because if Congress had so intended, "at least some of
the Members would have identified or mentioned it at some point"); Church of
Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987) ("We think... by analogy to Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle's 'dog that did not bark,' that an amendment having the
effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by its
sponsor, and not... as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill."). But
see Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) (noting that "[iun
ascertaining the meaning of the statute, a court cannot, in the manner of
Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.").
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rule to avoid absurd interpretations, 70 the rule that implied re-
peals are not favored,71 the rejected proposal rule,72 and the
rule that remedial legislation should be interpreted broadly.73
In essence, these canons of construction allow a court to draw
inferences about legislative intent based on the manner in
which the statute was written.74
II. BERGEN COMMERCIAL BANK V. SISLER: TOO YOUNG
TO BE A VP?
Bergen Commercial Bank recruited Sisler in 1993 to oper-
ate its merchant and credit card programs.7 5 At that time,
Sisler was employed by another bank and was not actively
seeking employment. 76 After numerous meetings with the up-
per management of Bergen, Sisler accepted the job.7 7 Prior to
commencing his job at the bank, Sisler met with Tony Bruno,
the bank's chairman and co-founder.7 8 During the course of
their conversation, Bruno asked Sisler his age, to which Sisler
responded that he was twenty-five years old.7 9 According to
Sisler, Bruno was shocked by this information and requested
that Sisler not share his age with anyone else at the bank, be-
cause the combination of his youth, substantial responsibilities,
70. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(noting that "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results
are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative
purpose are available").
71. Under this rule, in the absence of a specific statement, no changes are
presumed. See e.g., State v. Des Marets, 455 A.2d 1074, 1081 (N.J. 1983) (rec-
ognizing that implied repeals are not favored, but stipulating that this pre-
sumption can be overcome by a showing of "irreconcilable inconsistency" be-
tween the two pieces of legislation).
72. See, e.g., Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741, 743-44 (8th Cir.
1975) (noting that a statement in the majority report could not be accorded
any weight because "[i]t is evident to us that the Congress, as a whole, rejected
the viewpoint stated in the majority report of the Senate Finance Committee
and intended the plain meaning of the amendment to have effect").
73. See, e.g., Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 796 (D.N.J.
1997) (explaining that because the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination is
remedial social legislation, it is deserving of a liberal construction).
74. For a more complete discussion of statutory interpretation, see gener-
ally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 66.
75. See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 704 A.2d 1017, 1019 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
76. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 947-48.





and high salary would be an embarrassment to the organiza-
tion.80 Eight days after he started his new job, Bruno and the
president of Bergen informed Sisler that they "didn't think this
was going to work" and encouraged Sisler to accept a lower-
level position.81 Sisler refused to do so and, five months later,
was terminated and replaced by a thirty-one year-old individ-
ual.82
The trial court granted summary judgment for Bergen
Bank concerning the age discrimination claim, finding that the
legislature undoubtedly intended to limit the protected class to
individuals over the age of forty.8 3 The Appellate Division re-
jected this interpretation of the LAD and held that the statute
affords broad protection, regardless of the worker's age.8 4 Fur-
ther, the court stated that two issues must be taken into ac-
count in the construction of the term "age": first, whether there
was any implication that such protection should be limited to a
particular age; and second, whether there was any implication
that the protection from age discrimination was only to be af-
forded to older workers. 85
The Supreme Court of New Jersey began its inquiry into
the scope of the LAD by noting that the New Jersey courts had
traditionally construed the statute in a manner consistent with
adjudication under analogous federal statutory provisions. 86
The Appellate Division, however, had rejected this method of
interpretation in Sisler. The Appellate Division reasoned that
significant differences in the pertinent language of the ADEA
and the LAD necessitated an independent analysis of the scope
of the LAD. 87 In particular, the lack of any age range in the





84. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 704 A.2d 1017, 1022 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
85. See id.
86. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 949. For example, in Burke v. Township of
Franklin, the Appellate Division held that a 39 year-old individual could not
bring a valid age discrimination claim because he did not fall within the pro-
tected class as defined by the ADEA. 619 A.2d 643, 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993). The court stated that because he was only 39 years of age, "plain-
tiff did not fall within the protected class under the ADEA, and no material
issue of fact exists here under the applicable federal law." Id. at 647.
87. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 950.
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by the ADEA. 88 Agreeing with the Appellate Division, the high
court of New Jersey concluded that a court must conduct an in-
dependent analysis when a LAD provision differs substantively
from a similar federal statutory scheme.89
Based on its analysis of the age protection afforded under
the LAD, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the stat-
ute allowed individuals under forty to bring age discrimination
claims.90 In reaching this conclusion, the Sisler court relied on
analyses in decisions from the high courts in Washington and
Oregon that interpreted state anti-age discrimination provi-
sions, scant legislative history, and a few basic principles of
statutory interpretation.91
The Sisler court began its analysis by looking at the text of
the statute itself, noting that the task of statutory interpreta-
tion must always begin with the statute's plain language-the
clearest expression of statutory meaning.9 2 The court stated
that if the meaning of a statute is clear, the judiciary is obli-
gated to implement the statute as written, without using any
"judicial interpretation, rules of construction, or extrinsic mat-
ters."93
At the same time, however, the court noted that if different
interpretations of a statute are possible, the plain language of
the statute is not clear and the courts may apply principles of
statutory construction.94 Two factors led the Sisler court to
conclude that varying interpretations of the statute were possi-
ble: first, the different interpretations of the word "age" by the
trial court and the Appellate Division;95 and second, the differ-
ent conclusions reached by the courts of Washington and Ore-
gon in cases involving interpretation of age discrimination
statutes.96
First, the court noted that the trial court interpreted the
word "age" in narrow fashion, to apply exclusively to older
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 958.
91. See id. at 949-53.
92. See id. at 950 (noting that "[tihe first step in any statutory analysis is
to examine the statute's plain language as the clearest indication of meaning"
(citations omitted)).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 950-51.




workers.9 7 This interpretation contrasted with the Appellate
Division's broad interpretation of the word "age," which it
found to extend protection to workers of any age who might
face discrimination based on that characteristic.9 8 The Sisler
court concluded that these "divergent interpretations mili-
tate[d] against a finding that the meaning of the term 'age'
[was] facially obvious or self-evident."99
Similarly, the court acknowledged that the high courts of
Washington and Oregon had reached different conclusions re-
garding whether younger workers are entitled to protection
under statutory age discrimination provisions. 1°° Discussing
Gross v. Lynnwood, 10 the Sisler court noted that two statutes
influenced the Gross court's decision. While the first statute
failed to mention any age range within which protection from
age discrimination would be afforded, the second statute lim-
ited the age discrimination protection to individuals between
the ages of forty and sixty-five. 10 2 Because of the limitations
imposed by the second statute, which was construed in pari
materia with the first,10 3 the Gross court concluded that only
older workers were protected from age discrimination. 104 A
contrary interpretation, the Gross court noted, would lead to
the undesirable result of rendering the language of the second






101. 583 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Wash. 1978); see also supra notes 31-45 and ac-
companying text (explaining the facts and the Gross court's conclusion that
protections afforded by the anti-age discrimination provisions were limited to
individuals between the ages of 40 and 65).
102. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 951.
103. See id. Statutes or document provisions that are in pari materia are
those that relate to the same person or subject. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1115 (6th ed. 1990). For examples of case law discussing the doctrine of in
pari materia, see In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 693 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J.
1997) (stating that '[statutes in pari materia are to be construed together
when helpful in resolving doubts or uncertainties and the ascertainment of
legislative intent" (quoting State v. Green, 303 A.2d 312, 316 (N.J. 1973)));
Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 527 A.2d 1368, 1371 (N.J. 1987) (de-
termining that "[iun discerning [legislative] intent we consider not only the
particular statute in question, but also the entire legislative scheme of which
it is a part").
104. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 951; see also supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
105. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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Mindful of the Gross court's holding, the Sisler court
turned its attention to the Supreme Court of Oregon's interpre-
tation of the anti-age discrimination statute in Ogden v. Bu-
reau of Labor.0 6 The Oregon statute stated explicitly that pro-
tection against age discrimination was limited to individuals
between eighteen and seventy years of age. 0 7 The combination
of this explicit age range and the lack of additional statutory
ambiguity allowed the Ogden court to part with the Gross deci-
sion. The Ogden court held that based on the plain language of
the statute, a thirty year-old plaintiff could state a valid age
discrimination claim.108
Following its separate consideration of these two cases, the
Sisler court attempted to reconcile the divergent outcomes. 10 9
The court attributed the conflicting outcomes to the fact that
the word "age" was not subject to a clear and unambiguous in-
terpretation. 110 Accordingly, the court concluded that the lack
of any clear definition of the term supported Bergen Bank's po-
sition that the New Jersey legislature's intent in prohibiting
age discrimination was not clear on its face."' Therefore, the
court turned to other statutory interpretation considerations.
After concluding that a textual analysis would not resolve
the meaning of the LAD's age provision, the Sisler court next
considered the legislative intent behind the addition of the anti-
age discrimination provision. 112 This task, however, was ren-
dered significantly more difficult by the fact that no statement
of purpose accompanied the 1962 amendment to the LAD." 3
This void left the Sisler court only two tools with which to di-
vine the legislative intent behind the age provision: (1) the
106. 699 P.2d 189 (Or. 1985).
107. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
108. See Ogden, 699 P.2d at 194.
109. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 952.
110. See id. at 951 (stating that "the courts of Washington and Oregon
have disagreed on whether younger workers are protected by state anti-age-
discrimination provisions that, like New Jersey's, do not facially limit the pro-
tected class to older workers"); see also id. at 952 (explaining "whereas the
Washington court felt constrained by policy considerations to limit its age dis-
crimination provisions to 'mature workers,' the Oregon court, reading its stat-
ute plainly, concluded that 'age' should not be so narrowly construed, citing
the broad legislative purpose behind the discrimination laws").
111. See id. (noting that "[tihose decisions lend support to Bergen Bank's
position in this case that the legislative intent in proscribing age discrimina-





canon mandating that the court avoid construing a statute in a
manner that would render other sections superfluous, and (2)
two studies examining age discrimination that pre-dated the
addition of the age provision and likely influenced the legisla-
ture.1
1 4
Noting the rule of statutory construction that courts should
avoid construing a statute in a manner that would render any
word of a statute inoperative, superfluous or meaningless, the
Sisler court considered two other sections of the LAD." 5 First,
the court noted that section 10:5-2.1 stated that nothing in the
LAD would require an employer to hire an applicant under the
age of eighteen." 6 Second, the court discussed section 10:3-1
which prohibited appointing officers from discriminating on the
basis of age in hiring state employees where the applicant was
forty years of age or older." 7 The Sisler court concluded that
these two provisions of the LAD would be rendered superfluous
if the .protected class of individuals included only those indi-
viduals over the age of forty."8
Following this analysis, the Sisler court turned its atten-
tion to two studies concerning the difficulties that older work-
ers encounter in the workplace. Both studies were completed
before the passage of the 1962 anti-age discrimination amend-
ment to the LAD." 9 In short, these studies concluded that
workers over the age of forty-five were most severely affected
by age discrimination. 120
The Sisler court acknowledged that the legislature may or
may not have considered these publications when amending
the LAD to add the anti-age discrimination provision. 121 To the
extent that it did consider these studies, however, the court
held that the age range of forty-five to sixty-five recommended
by the Commission on Aging was not adopted into the anti-age
discrimination provision. 122 The court supported this conclu-
114. See id.
115. See id.; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (providing addi-
tional examples of this rule's application).
116. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 952 (quoting § 10:5-2.1).
117. See id. (quoting § 10:3-1).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 952-53.
120. See id. at 953.
121. See id.




sion by noting the absence of such age range language in the
statutory text.123
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the LAD's prohibition of age discrimina-
tion was broad enough to sustain a claim by a twenty-five year-
old individual. 124 This conclusion was driven largely by the fact
that while the ADEA expressly limits the protected class to in-
dividuals of age forty or above, the LAD contains no such limi-
tation, thereby precluding parallel interpretation. 125 As further
support for its decision, the court noted that indications of leg-
islative intent and the broad remedial purpose of anti-age dis-
crimination legislation warranted a liberal construction of the
statute. 126
III. FINDING PLAIN MEANING, FURTHERING THE
INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATIVE INTENT, AND REJECTING
PREEMPTION
Prior to Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, the New Jersey
courts consistently interpreted the LAD to limit age discrimi-
nation claims to individuals above the age of forty.127 The
analysis accompanying these decisions was conclusory and
based largely upon an unexplained incorporation of the ADEA's
age restrictions. Further, the conclusions concerning the age
range limitation were reached without serious consideration of
principles of statutory interpretation.
In contrast, the Sisler court reached the correct decision in
holding that the LAD is sufficiently broad to allow individuals
under the age of forty to bring age discrimination claims. In
doing so, however, the court failed to engage in a coherent pro-
cess of statutory interpretation. The Sisler court's reasoning
opens itself to criticism on three fronts. First, the court en-
gaged in almost no actual textual analysis 128 and missed an op-
portunity to support the statute as written. Second, although
there are bright points in the Sisler court's analysis of legisla-
tive intent, the court failed to draw many reasonable inferences
123. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 953.
124. See id. at 957.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
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which would have solidified its analysis. 129 Third, the court de-
clined to analyze whether the LAD anti-age discrimination pro-
vision was preempted by the ADEA. 130 This failure is espe-
cially troublesome, given the fact that until Sisler, the New
Jersey courts had always interpreted the federal statute's age
range to limit the state law.131
A. PHANTOM TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
It is a common rule of statutory construction that the
courts must strive to give effect to the legislative intent behind
a statute. 132 Further, the best way to discover such intent is
through an examination of the statute's plain language, which
is the clearest indication of meaning.133 Despite this commonly
accepted approach, the Sisler court failed to examine the plain
meaning of the New Jersey anti-age discrimination statute.
In reaching its conclusion that the text of the LAD was not
clear and unambiguous, the Sisler court relied on two factors.
First, the court examined the trial and appellate courts' textual
conclusions and found that because the two courts disagreed
about the scope of the word "age," the text was not clear and
unambiguous. 34  Second, the court emphasized that the
Washington and Oregon courts had reached conflicting deci-
sions regarding whether or not their state statutes could sup-
port age discrimination claims by individuals under forty.135
Both of these inquiries are inherently flawed.
1. Procedural Posture: Conflict in the Lower Courts
First, neither the trial court nor the appellate court based
their decision on the plain meaning of the word "age" in the
LAD. 136 Rather, the decisions were reached based on the
courts' independent inquiries into the legislative intent behind
the age amendment. As noted previously in this Comment, the
129. See infra Part III.B.
130. See infra Part 11I.C.
131. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (indicating that courts
should attempt to discern the plain meaning of statutory language as the
clearest indication of legislative intent).
134. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 100-11.




legislative intent behind the amendment was extremely diffi-
cult to discern because the legislative history was comprised
exclusively of two studies that the legislature may or may not
have consulted. 137 Despite the lack of supporting evidence, the
trial judge concluded that the Legislature must have consulted
the two studies that preceded the age amendment-the "'re-
ports clearly, unequivocally, without any doubt focused on a
protected class that was the result of age; that is, persons above
40 years of age, and higher who were being deprived of em-
ployment.'" 138 This statement illustrates that the trial judge
made no independent inquiry into whether the word "age" had
a clear and unambiguous meaning. On the contrary, her find-
ings were conclusory139 and based heavily on studies that the
legislature may not have consulted. 140
Although the Appellate Division's reasoning was more per-
suasive, it also failed to analyze the meaning of the word
"age." 141 This fact is demonstrated by the manner in which the
Appellate Division framed its inquiry in the case. The court
noted that in its "construction" of the word "age," it had to de-
termine whether there was any "implication" that the legisla-
ture intended to limit protection from age discrimination to a
particular age group or to older workers in general.142
The use of the words "construction" and "implication" indi-
cate that the Appellate Division passed over any actual consid-
eration of the word "age," and whether it had clear meaning as
written.143 "Construction" is defined as "the discovery and ap-
plication of the meaning and intention or of a statement of fact
137. As noted above, no significant legislative history accompanied the
1962 age amendment. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing two studies which may have influenced the legislature in its contem-
plation of adding an age provision to the LAD).
138. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 704 A.2d 1017, 1021 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (quoting the trial judge), affd, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999).
139. How the trial judge concluded that 40 was the appropriate lower limit
is unclear. Both the studies she consulted indicate that age discrimination
begins to have an effect at the age of 45. See supra notes 119-22 and accom-
panying text; see also infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
140. The trial judge may also be criticized for failing to consider other por-
tions of the same statute. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting
that context must be considered in statutory interpretation).
141. See Sisler, 704 A.2d at 1022.
142. See id.
143. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (stating that, in statutory




to a particular state of affairs."1' To discern the meaning of
the word "implication," resort must be had to the verb from
which this noun is derived, "imply." Two definitions of the verb
"to imply" are relevant in this context. First, the verb can
mean "to indicate or call for recognition of as existent, present,
or related not by express statement but by logical inference or
association or necessary consequence." 145 The second definition
reads "to convey or communicate not by direct forthright state-
ment but by allusion or reference likely to lead to natural infer-
ence."146 In short, if the Appellate Division had considered
whether the word "age" had a clear meaning, it would have
been unnecessary to resort to "construction" or "implication,"
unless it first found that "age" did not have a clear meaning.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the lower court
removed itself from the text of the statute itself before consid-
ering any unambiguous meaning of the word "age."
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that neither the trial
court nor the Appellate Division made any true inquiry into the
meaning of the term "age" as employed by the New Jersey leg-
islature. On the contrary, both courts neglected such a consid-
eration and analyzed only whether other indicators of legisla-
tive intent could shed light on the word's meaning. 147
Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion in
Sisler that the two lower courts' "divergent interpretations
militate against a finding that the meaning of the term 'age' is
facially obvious or self-evident"148 is simply incorrect.
2. Expanding the Inquiry to Other Jurisdictions: Conflicting
Interpretations of "Age"?
Because the Sisler court found the statute's text ambigu-
ous, it was correct to attempt to determine the legislative in-
tent behind the LAD. The court, however, mischaracterized the
144. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 489 (1986); see
also supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that this dictionary, among
others, is frequently consulted to discern the meaning of statutory terms). Al-
though other definitions exist, this one is particularly applicable, given the ex-
ample that follows it. Namely, Webster's gives the following example in its
definition of construction: "the construction put on a statute by a lawyer."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 489 (1986).
145. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1135 (1986) (em-
phasis added).
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
148. Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 k2d 944, 951 (N.J. 1999).
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issues in Gross and Ogden, and therefore erred in its interpre-
tation of their conclusions. Both the Gross and Ogden courts
found their anti-age discrimination statutes to be clear and un-
ambiguous as written. 149 Therefore, the Sisler court's conclu-
sion that "the courts of Washington and Oregon have disagreed
on whether younger workers are protected by state anti-age-
discrimination provisions that, like New Jersey's, do not fa-
cially limit the protected class to older workers,"150 is baseless
and inexplicable.
In Gross, the issue was not whether the statute as written
would support an age discrimination claim by a younger
worker. On the contrary, the Gross court made it explicitly
clear that the anti-age discrimination statute would support a
claim by a younger worker, because it failed to state an age
range.151 The issue was whether the total prohibition of age
discrimination contained in section 49.60.180 was limited by
section 49.44.090.152 Finding that the latter provision did limit
the application of the total prohibition of age discrimination,
the court rejected the contention that individuals under the age
of forty could bring age discrimination claims.' 53 Unlike
Washington, however, New Jersey has no corresponding stat-
ute that might limit a total prohibition of age discrimination.
Since there is no limiting statute in New Jersey, the reasoning
in Gross would seemingly support the contention that the LAD
represents a total prohibition on age discrimination.
In similar fashion, the Sisler court failed to recognize the
true question presented to the Supreme Court of Oregon in
Ogden. According to Sisler, the issue addressed in Ogden was
whether or not the term "age" could be narrowly construed so
as to exclude younger workers from protection. 154 This ques-
tion, however, was not the issue faced in Ogden. In Ogden, the
court stated that "[tlhe only issue of interpretation raised in the
petition for review is whether the statute requires the commis-
sioner to determine that age was the 'sole factor' in considering
applicants whose ages fall in the statutory range of 18 to 70
149. See supra notes 38, 52 and accompanying text.
150. Sisler, 723 A.2d at 951.
151. See Gross v. City of Lynwood, 583 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Wash. 1978) (en
banc) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1200.
154. See Sisler, 723 A.2d at 951-52.
1710 [Vol. 84:1689
AGE DISCRIMINATION
years."155 These words make it clear that the Ogden court
never considered excluding younger workers from the protected
class, so long as they were at least eighteen years of age. 156 In
fact, the Ogden court did not construe the word "age" at all, be-
cause the statute itself defined the protected class and allowed
the court to implement the instrument as written. 157
The Sisler court is also subject to criticism for its failure to
discuss Simpson v. Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights,158 in which the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Alaska considered an anti-age discrimination statute
almost identical to the one in Sisler 59 In Simpson, the court
acknowledged that based on the language of the statute, no age
limitations were acceptable. 60 The only question was whether
any legislative intent could be uncovered which would limit the
statute's protection to a particular age group. The district
court answered the question in the negative and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed this decision. 6 1 Thus, according to the Simpson
court, the word "age" could be applied as written to prohibit all
age-based discrimination. Given the similarity of the statutes
at issue in the two cases, the Sisler court should have used the
Simpson decision to support a decision based on the clear
meaning of the word "age."
3. A More Reasonable Approach Discerning Whether "Age" Is
Subject to a Clear and Unambiguous Meaning
Based on the preceding discussion of reasoning adopted by
the trial court and the Appellate Division as well as an analysis
of the issues and holdings in Gross and Ogden, it is clear that
the Sisler court provided no support for its conclusion that
155. Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 190 (Or. 1985) (citing OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.015).
156. See id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
157. A substantial body of case law supports applying the statute's plain
meaning when possible. See, e.g., supra note 92 and accompanying text.
158. 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976) (adjudicating under a statute
similar to the anti-age discrimination statute in Sisler), affd, 608 F.2d 1171
(9th Cir. 1979).
159. See id. at 553-54 (providing that "[ilt is unlawful for an employer ...
to discriminate against [a person] in compensation or in a term, condition, or
privilege or employment because of... age ..... ' (quoting ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.220(a)(1))). Simpson, a 65 year-old individual, brought suit under this
statute claiming that his employer terminated him because of his age. See id.
at 553.
160. See id. at 554.
161. See id. at 556.
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"age" was not subject to a clear and unambiguous meaning.16 2
This fact is especially troublesome given the Sisler court's ac-
knowledgment that statutory analysis must always begin with
the text of the statute itself.163 The Sisler court's failure to
conduct its own independent analysis is confounding when one
considers that a method it had used in the past was readily at
its disposal. In prior cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court had
consulted dictionaries in discerning whether undefined statu-
tory terms could be implemented based on their plain mean-
ing.164
Consultation with Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary in this case would have led the Sisler court to conclude
that the word "age" by itself cannot reasonably be limited to
any particular age group.165 A number of relevant definitions
are worthy of consideration. Of the seven relevant definitions
that are provided, all but one provide clear support for the
proposition that "age" is broad enough to allow younger indi-
viduals to be included within the protected class. These defini-
tions include the following: (1) "the length of time during which
a being or thing has lived or existed: the length of life or exis-
tence from birth or beginning to the time spoken of or referred
to;" (2) "the complete duration of the life or existence of a being
or thing .... ;" (3) "any one of the periods or stages of life;" (4)
"the time of life at which one becomes naturally or convention-
ally'qualified or disqualified for something;" (5) "a measure of
the development, capacity, condition, or quality of an individual
or of one of his traits or parts that tends to alter with age, ex-
pressed as the chronological age at which such state is mean or
average;" and (6) "the period that is contemporary with a per-
son's lifetime."166
The first definition above is clearly age range neutral. It
fails to qualify the phrases 'length of time" and "length of life
or existence," which require no interpretation to conclude that
such length can be of short or long duration. 167 Similarly, the
second definition does not limit itself to people of an advanced
162. See supra Part III.A.1.
163. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (providing examples of such
cases).





age.168 This conclusion follows from the fact that "the complete
duration of life or existence" might be many years or just a few
minutes.16 9 In addition, no elaborate discussion is required to
conclude that the third definition--"any one of the periods or
stages of life"--is not limited to any particular age. 170  The
fourth definition also fails to exclude younger workers from the
protected class. People become "naturally qualified or disquali-
fied" to do things at many different stages in life. 17 1 For exam-
ple, a young adult becomes qualified to serve in the armed
forces at age eighteen, but is disqualified from access to the ju-
venile courts at that same age. Likewise, a young adult is not
qualified to receive Social Security benefits, whereas a sixty-
five year-old individual is so qualified. Neither does the fifth
definition suggest that "age" refers only to older workers be-
cause many "traits" tend to alter with age, such as height, shoe
size, and depth of voice.172 Finally, the sixth definition can be
dismissed for the same reasons as the second--"the period con-
temporary with a person's lifetime" can refer to either a short
or a long period of time. 173
The preceding definitions justify the conclusion that the
term "age," without more, is clear, unambiguous and capable of
being applied as written, unless a contrary definition suggests
otherwise. In fact, another definition is available, one that cuts
in the other direction and demands serious consideration.
Webster's provides the following alternative definition of the
term: "an advanced stage of life: the latter part of life.., the
quality or state of being old."174 Although at first blush this
definition appears to force the conclusion that "age" alone is
ambiguous, more exacting scrutiny reveals that this definition
can apply only in certain contexts.
Two examples that follow the definition help illustrate this
point. The first example, "the feebleness of age,"175 requires no
lengthy consideration to conclude that it could only apply to an











wither her"17 6 clearly limits the possible meaning of the word
age to older individuals. These two examples have one thing in
common: their context lends them the meaning they desire.
Without such context, the term "age" cannot be limited to older
individuals.
The preceding examples indicate that unless the term
"age" is used in a very specific context, it is unreasonable to
limit its application to older workers. Does the LAD impose
such limitations? This question must clearly be answered in
the negative. Section 10:5-4 provides, "[aill persons shall have
the opportunity to obtain employment,... without discrimina-
tion because of... age."1 77 The statute provides no specific con-
text and therefore demands the conclusion that "age" refers to
all workers, regardless of what stage of life they presently oc-
cupy.' 78 Accordingly, the LAD is clear and unambiguous and
can be applied as plainly written.
B. IN SUPPORT OF THE LAD's PLAIN LANGUAGE: USING
EXTRINSIC AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO UNCOVER
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It would be unfair and misleading to criticize the Sisler
court without acknowledging some positive points in its analy-
sis. Under the rule to avoid surplusage, the legislature is pre-
sumed to have employed only those words it intended to have
meaning and effect.' 79 Using this rule, the Sisler court noted
that sections of the LAD that provided specific age limitations
in certain situations would be rendered superfluous if the stat-
ute as a whole was interpreted not to represent a total ban on
age discrimination. 80
The court's use of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
canon to broaden the statute's application was also insightful.
At the same time, however, the court should have applied the
rule more aggressively to support the plain meaning of the
LAD. The Sisler court provided only two examples of excep-
176. Id.
177. N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 1999).
178. This fact distinguishes the statute in Gross, where the application of
the anti-age discrimination statute was limited by another section of the same
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
179. See supra text accompanying note 42.
180. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text; see also supra note 24
and accompanying text (providing the actual language of the two relevant sec-
tions of the LAD).
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tions to the absolute prohibition against age discrimination
contained in the LAD.18 Specifically, the court noted that sec-
tion 10:3-1 allowed the state government to make age-based
decisions when the job applicant was under the age of forty. 82
This example lends support to the idea that the legislature un-
derstood how to create exceptions to the prohibition of all age
discrimination. 8 3 At the same time, however, it is only one of
two examples offered by the court.
There are many other exceptions to the absolute prohibi-
tion against age discrimination contained in section 10:5-418
4
that the Sisler court left untouched. For example, the statute
allows employers to refuse to employ and advance persons over
the age of seventy,i8 5 to require the retirement of high-ranking
executives who are entitled to receive retirement benefits, l8 6 to
establish legitimate occupational qualifications which require
the attainment of a reasonable minimum age, 87 to refuse to
employ individuals under the age of eighteen, 88 and to dis-
criminate on the basis of competence.' 8 9 Given the availability
of all these exceptions, if the court was going to exploit the ex-
pressio unius canon at all, it would have been more persuasive
to provide more examples.
Although expressio unius is only an aid in determining
legislative intent and not a rule of law,190 three factors support
an aggressive application of the canon in this situation. First,
the decisions in Gross'91 and Ogden,192 along with independent
analysis, support the conclusion that the term "age" is unambi-
guous. 193 Thus, there should be no concerns that the canon will
181. See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 952 (N.J. 1999).
182. See id.
183. See supra notes 68, 72 and accompanying text (providing examples of
expressio unius and the rejected proposal rule).
184. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (quoting relevant portions of
this section of the statute).
185. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-2.1, -12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).




190. See State v. Dicarlo, 338 A.2d 809, 814 (N.J. 1975) (arguing that ex-
pressio unius should be employed with caution and should not be used to over-
come clearly expressed congressional intent).
191. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 46-52.
193. See supra Part IIIA.
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be employed to defeat, rather than give effect to, legislative in-
tent.194
Second, the LAD is remedial legislation and therefore
should be accorded as broad an application as possible.195
Based on this oft-applied rule of statutory construction,
younger individuals must be included in the protected class
unless the statute explicitly excludes them. The many excep-
tions to the LAD's prohibition of discrimination, none of which
mentions individuals under forty, lend further support to the
contention that protection from age discrimination should be
extended to younger individuals. 196 The legislature thus un-
derstood the implications of it actions and limited the applica-
tion of the statute where it deemed necessary.
Third, and most persuasive, is the fact that the legislature
allowed for specific age-based exceptions. 197 Nothing in the act
requires employers to hire individuals under the age of eight-
een, nor prohibits the establishment of other reasonable age
requirements for apprenticeships. 198 Any assertion that the
legislature crafted the exceptions in such fashion, but still in-
tended to limit the protected age class to those above forty, ex-
ceeds the bounds of reason. If employers were allowed to dis-
criminate on the basis of age against individuals under the age
of forty, an exception for individuals under eighteen would be
unnecessary. Such an interpretation would be absurd, and ac-
cordingly, must be rejected. 199
The Sisler court's use of the rejected proposal rule2°° in
considering the two studies that pre-dated the age amendment
to the LAD, also deserves mention.201 The court correctly con-
cluded that to the extent the legislature considered the studies,
they rejected the recommendations therein contained.20 2 Both
studies suggested that discrimination in employment becomes
194. See Dicarlo, 338 A.2d at 814.
195. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting cases construing
statutes with remedial purposes and affording them liberal interpretation).
196. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
197. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-2.1, -12(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
198. See id. § 10:5-2.1.
199. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(stating that absurd results should be rejected where a more reasonable inter-
pretation consistent with legislative intent can be reached).
200. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing rejected proposal
rule and providing case law illustrations).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22 (discussing studies).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
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a serious problem for workers when they attain the age forty-
five.20 3 Because the reports provided outside age parameters
which the legislature could have included, but did not, one
must conclude that the legislature rejected such limitations. 2°4
Although this conclusion is helpful, it fails to reach a
deeper issue that Sisler left unresolved. If both studies on age
discrimination in employment indicated that such discrimina-
tion begins around the age of forty-five, why did the New Jer-
sey courts, for years, limit the protected class to individuals of
age forty or older?20 5 Because there is no apparent correlation
between the ages, there is no sound reason for the court to con-
clude that the legislature was influenced by the studies, unless
some outside consideration can validate the inference.
It is possible that the New Jersey legislature relied on the
ADEA's explicit age range when it imposed the lower age
limit.206 This contention must be rejected, however, when one
considers that the ADEA did not exist at the time of the
amendment. 207 Therefore, the ADEA could not have influenced
the state legislature, unless it anticipated the federal legisla-
tion, consulted studies it knew Congress was considering, ana-
lyzed such studies, and intended to mirror the action it believed
Congress would take. This inquiry is not only highly abstract
and speculative, it is absurd.20 8 The primary literature that in-
fluenced Congress's decision to limit the protected class to indi-
viduals between the ages of forty and sixty-five was the report
of the Secretary of Labor, which was published three years af-
ter the age amendment to the LAD. 20 9 Moreover, the figures
upon which the Secretary of Labor relied date back only to
1964.210 Therefore, it is impossible that the New Jersey legisla-
ture was influenced by any action at the federal level. It could
203. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
204. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-4). Of course, this argument assumes that the legislature did, in fact,
consult the studies.
205. See supra note 30 and accompanying text..
206. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(c)(1) (1994).
207. See supra notes 10, 13 and accompanying text (discussing applicable
sections of the ADEA).
208. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that absurd inter-
pretations should be rejected).
209. See supra notes 12, 15-21 and accompanying text (discussing findings
that were published in the 1965 report of the Secretary of Labor).
210. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing 1964 length of
unemployment rates for individuals over the age of 45).
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not have intended that the LAD's protected class parallel that
of the ADEA.
C. THE PREEMPTION ISSUE: DiD TE ADEA PREEMPT MORE
ExPANSIvE STATE LEGISLATION?
Given that the ADEA could not have influenced the New
Jersey legislature's age amendment in 1962, the next question
is whether the ADEA preempted more expansive state anti-age
discrimination laws. This inquiry must focus on three consid-
erations: the text of the ADEA, the legislative history accompa-
nying the federal legislation, and Congress's failure to act fol-
lowing the Simpson and Ogden decisions. In Simpson, the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska noted
that federal preemption can occur in three ways.211 Having es-
tablished this test, the Simpson court then quickly rejected any
contention that the ADEA preempted state regulation in this
area.212
1. Conflict or Harmony?
The same conclusions that the Simpson court reached in
rejecting the preemption argument can be used to validate Sis-
ler. First, the age amendment to the LAD 213 does not conflict
with the substantive provisions of the ADEA-every individual
afforded protection under the ADEA is also protected under the
LAD. The state law simply expands upon the protection af-
forded by the federal statute.214 New Jersey employers can
comply with both provisions by not discriminating on the basis
211. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. First, preemption can occur
when federal and state statutes conflict in such a way that compliance with
both is impossible. See Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights,
423 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D. Alaska 1976), affd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
Second, it occurs where "the nature of the subject matter requires federal su-
premacy and uniformity." Id. Third, a federal statute preempts state legisla-
tion where "Congress intended to displace state legislation." Id.
212. See Simpson, 423 F. Supp. at 555-56 (noting first that the state stat-
ute was complimentary and not conflicting; second, that there was no congres-
sional intent to preempt in this area; and third, that the states have tradition-
ally had broad powers to legislate in the area of employment).
213. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing text of the LAD
age amendment).
214. Nothing in the LAD changes the protections afforded under the
ADEA. The state legislation expands on the ADEA's 40-65 age range to allow




of age. The New Jersey law would be preempted only if it re-
duced the protection afforded under the federal statute.215
2. Traditional Area of State Legislation
States traditionally have regulated widely in the area of
employment law, and therefore, federal preemption "should not
be lightly inferred."216 Although it is true that expansive state
laws regulating employment have been preempted on occasion,
invalidation occurs only when state legislation frustrates the
goal Congress intended to achieve via the federal regulation.217
No such concern is implicated, however, in the case of the LAD.
The lone purpose of the ADEA was to promote the employment
of older workers based on their ability.21 8 The LAD retains all
of the substantive rights afforded to the protected class under
the ADEA.219 Thus, it does nothing to frustrate the purpose of
the federal legislation.
3. Congressional Intent To Preempt
An examination of the text of the ADEA and its legislative
history makes clear that Congress did not intend to create an
area of exclusive federal regulation. On the contrary, the text
of the ADEA expresses a desire for states to legislate in this
area, and for such state laws to have priority over the com-
mencement of federal actions under the ADEA. Specifically,
§ 633(a) provides that, "[niothing in this chapter shall affect the
jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like func-
tions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on
account of age."220 Further, § 633(b) specifies that "[iln the case
of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a
law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of
age.., no suit may be brought under [the ADEA] before the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been com-
menced under the state law.' 221 Most importantly, nothing
within the text of the ADEA restricts the ability of the states to
enact more expansive anti-age discrimination laws. Since the
215. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
216. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246,252 (1994).
217. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
219. The LAD picks up where the ADEA leaves off to prohibit all age-based
discrimination. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
220. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a).
221. Id. § 633(b).
20001 1719
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
text of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent,222
one must presume that Congress did not intend to preempt
state legislation.
Moreover, the legislative history accompanying the ADEA
only tends to support the text of the Act itself. Four factors
pertaining to this legislative history bear on legislative intent
and are worthy of mention. First, at the time Congress consid-
ered the ADEA, lawmakers discussed the state anti-age dis-
crimination laws that were currently in effect, but expressed no
desire to preempt state laws that defined the protected class in
a more liberal manner.223 Congress was clearly aware that
some state statutes defined the protected class in such fashion.
Specifically, Congress supported its decision to limit the lower
age range to forty by stating that such age "is also the lower
age limit found in most State statutes bearing on this sub-
ject."224 By using the word "most" rather than "all," Congress
indicated that it was aware of some more liberal state statutes.
At the time the ADEA was enacted, at least five states had age
discrimination laws that defined the protected class more
broadly than the subsequently enacted ADEA.225 Applying the
theory of "the dog that did not bark,2 26 one must conclude that
Congress did not intend to preempt more expansive state laws.
Instead, this evidence supports the idea that Congress intended
that the ADEA provide minimum standards below which state
laws could not fall.227
Second, to the extent that state anti-age discrimination
laws were discussed in the legislative history accompanying the
ADEA, such discussion centered on whether the state laws
were providing sufficient relief.228 More specifically, the legis-
lative history makes it clear that Congress supported state
legislation, but questioned whether it was having any substan-
tial effect.229 This fact makes it very difficult to conclude that
222. See National Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex County Improvement
Auth., 695 A.2d 1381, 1389 (N.J. 1997).
223. See id.
224. H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 1-2 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2213, 2214 (emphasis added).
225. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining this theory and
giving case examples of its application).
227. See generally Moberly, supra note 61.
228. See H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 1-2, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213,
2214.
229. See id., reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214.
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Congress intended to restrict the ability of states to legislate in
more expansive fashion.
Third, the text of § 633(b) reveals that Congress did con-
sider some state provisions that may have been inconsistent
with the federal law. Section 633(b) of the statute provides,
"[i]f any requirement for the commencement of such proceeding
is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the
filing of a written and signed statement of the facts.., the pro-
ceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the pur-
poses of [the ADEA]. ' 230 This statement indicates that Con-
gress did consider state procedures that affected enforcement
under the ADEA and acted where it deemed it necessary to do
so. Accordingly, under the expressio unius canon of statutory
construction, one should not assume that Congress intended to
displace any other portions of more liberal state legislation.231
Finally, Congress was well aware that, by defining the pro-
tected class in the way it did, it was excluding airline steward-
esses from age discrimination relief.232 The legislative history
accompanying the bill addressed this concern and explained
that although Congress wanted to protect airline flight atten-
dants from arbitrary age discrimination, it felt that doing so
would detract from the overall purpose of the bill-protecting
older workers.233 Accordingly, Congress understood that some
individuals under forty faced age discrimination, but decided
not to act. The combination of this recognition, the explicit tex-
tual grant of authority to the states to legislate in this area,234
and Congress's clear ability to nullify state procedures where it
deemed necessary,235 make it reasonable to conclude that Con-
gress intended to leave states free to define the protected class
in a more liberal fashion.
4. Sitting on Their Hands: Congressional Silence Following
Simpson and Ogden
In addition to the preceding analysis of the ADEA's text
and the legislative intent behind the Act, congressional silence
230. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1994).
231. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining the expressio
unius canon).
232. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
234. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)-(b) (granting states the power to legislate
against discriminatory age practices).
235. See id. § 633(b).
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following the Simpson and Ogden decisions is significant. In
these cases, the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon allowed age discrimination claims that would have been
summarily dismissed under the ADEA. More specifically, the
Simpson court validated an Alaska statute that allowed indi-
viduals of any age to bring age discrimination claims. 236 Simi-
larly, in Ogden, the court applied an Oregon statute that pro-
tected individuals between the ages of eighteen and seventy
from age discrimination. 237 Congress has had ample time since
these decisions to amend the ADEA in a manner so as to pre-
clude such expansive state legislation. This failure to act pro-
vides evidence of the reasonableness of the conclusions reached
in Simpson and Ogden and lends further support to the Sisler
decision.238
CONCLUSION
In Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court determined that the age provision in the New Jer-
sey Law Against Discrimination was broad enough to support
an age discrimination claim by a twenty-five year-old individ-
ual. Although the Sisler court reached the correct conclusion, it
missed an opportunity to provide a strong thread of analysis for
New Jersey lower courts and other state courts that will look to
the decision in the future. In short, had the Sisler court more
thoroughly researched and analy~ed the issue, it would have
provided other states with a wealth of ammunition to pass and
support age discrimination protections which begin where the
ADEA ends.
Despite its weaknesses, the Sisler decision represents a
call for both judicial and legislative activism at the state level.
Sisler provides a model for the courts in Iowa, Kansas, Michi-
gan, and New Hampshire239-whose anti-age discrimination
statutes contain no minimum age limits-to interpret these
statutes broadly to support claims by younger individuals.
Such a construction does nothing to offend the goals of the
236. See Simpson v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp.
552, 556 (D. Alaska 1976), affd, 608 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
237. See Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 190 (Or. 1985).
238. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 474 U.S. 121, 137
(1985) (reasoning that congressional inaction in the face of a well-known judi-
cial interpretation of a statute provides strong evidence of the reasonableness
of that interpretation).
239. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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ADEA; in fact, a liberal interpretation only furthers the
ADEA's purpose of promoting individuals based on ability
alone. In addition, the legislatures in other states should
amend their anti-age discrimination statutes by removing their
minimum age provisions.240 Following Sisler, state legislatures
can take such action knowing that nothing in the ADEA pre-
vents them from doing so.
240. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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